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Abstract 
In this article I discuss G. A. Cohen’s account of the principles animating 
the socialist ideal. In his book Why Not Socialism? Cohen argues that socialism 
is based on two principles of radical equality of opportunity and community. 
Although I am quite sympathetic to Cohen’s contribution, I identify what I take 
to be some problems in it and suggest ways to overcome them. I challenge 
Cohen’s claim that although the principle of radical equality of opportunity is a 
principle of justice, the principle of community is only a wider moral 
requirement. I argue that to fully account for the role and weight of 
considerations of community within the socialist ideal, and to justify the 
limitations on liberty that they would impose in practice, we have reason to see 
some of them as more stringent demands of justice. More specifically, I propose 
a construal of some of the demands of community as focused on sufficientarian                                                         
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concerns with basic needs and on requirements to protect equal political status 
and self-respect, and explain how, so construed, the demands of community 
relate to demands of equality of economic opportunity and to the protection of 
personal and political liberty.  
 
Résumé 
Dans cet article, je discute le point de vue de G.A. Cohen sur les 
principes qui animent l ‘idéal socialiste. Dans son livre ‘Pourquoi Pas Le 
Socialisme?’ Cohen maintient que le socialisme est basé sur les deux principes 
d’égalité radicale de l’opportunité et de la communauté. Même si je partage 
assez largement cette conception, j’en identifie quelques problèmes de mon 
point de vue et suggère quelque pistes pour les combler. Contre Cohen, je ne 
pense pas que le principe d’égalité radicale d’opportunité soit un principe de 
justice, alors que le principe de communauté serait seulement un impératif 
moral plus large. Je maintiens qu’afin de rendre compte pleinement du rôle et 
du poids des considérations sur la communauté dans l’idéal socialiste, et de 
justifier les limitations sur la liberté qu’elles imposeraient en pratique, nous 
avons raison de penser que certaines d’entre elles expriment des demandes 
fortes de justice . Plus spécifiquement, je propose de reformuler certaines 
demandes des communautés centrées sur des préoccupations d’autosuffisance 
relatives à des besoins fondamentaux et sur les conditions de protection de 
l’égalité politique et du respect de soi, et j’explique comment, sous cet angle, les 
demandes d’une communauté sont étroitement liées à des demandes d’égalité 
d’opportunité et de protection de la liberté personnelle et politique. 
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Is socialism a desirable ideal? What principles ground it? In Why Not Socialism?2 
G. A. Cohen argues that the socialist ideal is indeed desirable, that we have reason to 
favor the general implementation of the principles of radical equality of opportunity and 
community on which it relies. Cohen also considers the issue of the feasibility of 
socialism.  His agnostic conclusion on this issue is that we do not now know whether 
socialism is feasible or infeasible, although we can realistically envisage multiple partial 
approximations and instantiations of its demands. In this paper I focus on Cohen’s 
discussion on desirability.3 Although I am quite sympathetic to Cohen’s contribution, I 
identify what I take to be some problems in it and suggest ways to overcome them. I                                                         
2 Cohen (2009). Parenthetical page numbers in the paper refer to pages in this book. For helpful 
explanations of how this book fits within Cohen’s overall corpus of writings, see Cunningham (2009) and 
Vrousalis (2010). 
3 I discuss Cohen’s treatment of the issue of feasibility in Gilabert (2011). See also the important recent 
discussion in Wright (2010). 
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challenge Cohen’s claim that although the principle of radical equality of opportunity is a 
principle of justice, the principle of community is only a wider moral requirement. I 
argue that to fully account for the role and weight of considerations of community within 
the socialist ideal, and to justify the limitations on liberty that they would impose in 
practice, we have reason to see some of them as more stringent demands of justice. More 
specifically, I propose a construal of some of the demands of community as focused on 
sufficientarian concerns with basic needs and on requirements to protect equal political 
status and self-respect, and explain how, so construed, the demands of community relate 
to demands of equality of economic opportunity and to the protection of personal and 
political liberty.  
  Cohen’s aim in his short book is more suggestive and exploratory than systematic. 
Thus in this paper I do not aim at criticizing Cohen’s work for not doing what is not 
meant to do. My constructive aim is, instead, to pursue the exploration further, 
identifying additional challenges and proposing fruitful ways to address them. Thus, the 
goal of this paper is to further frame the issue of how we should think about the principles 
grounding the desirability of socialism. 
 
Socialist Principles of Equality and Community 
 
Cohen suggests that the socialist ideal is framed by two principles.4 The first is a 
principle of equality of opportunity, and the second is a principle of community. In this 
section I reconstruct these two principles and in the following sections I probe their status 
and relation. 
  Equality of opportunity can be construed in different ways, according to the 
obstacles to people’s life chances that are deemed morally desirable to remove or mitigate 
in an egalitarian way. Cohen proposes a “socialist,” “radical principle of equality of 
opportunity,” which includes but goes beyond two other principles of equality of 
opportunity. The “bourgeois” principle demands that we remove obstacles to life chances 
springing from certain formal and informal status constraints, such as those undermining 
the life prospects of serfs in a feudal society or of members of certain groups in societies 
with a racist culture. Non-discrimination regulations constitute an example of 
implementation of this principle. The “left-liberal” principle goes further, demanding that 
we remove inequalities in life prospects that result from unchosen social circumstances 
such as the social class in which people are born. This principle grounds redistributive                                                         
4 Cohen presents these principles first as an elucidation of the kind of view that we would adopt if we were 
thinking about how to organize our affairs as co-participants in a camping trip, and then proceeds to argue 
that their implementation is also desirable in the wider context of a modern society. Even further, he says 
that socialists might want these principles to apply on an international scale (p. 46). For simplicity, I will 
focus here only on the context of a domestic society, leaving aside the issues of local and global justice. 
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policies, such as the funding for excellent public education, that offset the initial 
disadvantage faced by people belonging to poorer households. But this principle is 
insufficient in that it does not address inequalities in life chances that spring from 
people’s differences in native talents. The radical, socialist principle completes the 
response to the inegalitarian impact on life chances of unchosen circumstances by 
demanding that we also attend to differing natural endowments. Thus: 
 
[S]ocialist equality of opportunity treats the inequality that arises out of 
native differences as a further source of injustice, beyond that imposed by 
unchosen social backgrounds, since native differences are equally 
unchosen … Socialist equality of opportunity seeks to correct for all 
unchosen disadvantages, disadvantages, that is, for which the agent cannot 
herself reasonably be held responsible, whether they be disadvantages that 
reflect social misfortune or disadvantages that reflect natural misfortune. 
When socialist equality of opportunity prevails, differences of outcome 
reflect nothing but differences of taste and choice, not differences in 
natural and social capacities and powers (p. 17-8).5 
 
  The socialist principle of equality of opportunity (hereafter SPE) does not demand 
equality of outcome. It is compatible with inequalities of benefit that result from people’s 
choices against a background of equality of opportunity. Cohen mentions three kinds of 
inequalities of this kind. The first concerns differences with respect to certain specific 
goods. For example, Amy may end up having more income than Ben, while Ben more 
leisure time than Amy. This kind of difference is not, according to Cohen, one we need to 
worry about. The reason is that it does not constitute “an inequality all things 
considered,” as “comparable aggregate enjoyment obtains” (p. 25). We are assuming here 
that each person’s packages of benefits reflect their preference regarding different goods. 
Thus, Amy and Ben are equally content given that Amy values income more than Ben 
and Ben values leisure more than Amy. 
  Cohen considers two other kinds of inequalities that do involve differences in 
overall benefit. The first ranges over inequalities resulting from “regrettable choice,” and 
the second concerns inequalities arising from “option luck” (p. 26). Thus, Alberto may 
end up having less of a good G than Beatriz, even though Alberto values G just as much as 
Beatriz does and has equal initial chances to get it, because Alberto puts less effort to 
obtain it (a regrettable choice), or because Alberto chooses to engage in a risky activity 
one of whose possible outcomes is a diminished ability to access G (thus undergoing bad                                                         
5 This is the so-called “luck-egalitarian” principle, according to which “an unequal distribution whose 
inequality cannot be vindicated by some choice or fault or desert on the part of (some of) the relevant 
affected agents is unfair, and therefore, pro tanto, unjust” (Cohen 2008, 7). 
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option luck). An example of the first case is Alberto’s careless decisions regarding training 
and education, and an example of the second case is Alberto’s choice to engage in 
gambling or risky investments. 
  These forms of inequality of outcome are problematic for socialists because 
socialism includes, besides a commitment to SPE, a commitment to a principle of 
community. This principle (hereafter PC), is first formulated in the following, general 
form: 
 
The requirement of community … is that people care about, and, where 
necessary and possible, care for, one another, and, too, care that they care 
about one another (p. 34-5). 
 
  Cohen discusses two modes of expression of PC. The first is geared to narrowing 
the inequalities that might emerge in a context in which SPE operates. In such a context, 
people committed to PC would feel that their communal bonds are weakened if some of 
them turn out to face many more challenges in their lives than others due to significant 
inequalities of income and other material advantages. They may then choose to eliminate 
some social arrangements leading to such inequalities, or to offset some of their results.  
  The second mode of expression is “communal reciprocity.” This expression of PC 
is not focused on narrowing inequality that SPE allows, but on shaping “human 
relationships” in such a way that they “take a desirable form:” 
 
Communal reciprocity is the antimarket principle according to which I 
serve you not because of what I can get in return by doing so but because 
you need or want my service, and you, for the same reason, serve me (p. 
39). 
 
The relationship between us under communal reciprocity is not the 
market instrumental one in which I give you because I get, but the 
noninstrumental one in which I give you because you need, or want, and 
in which I expect a comparable generosity from you (p. 43).6 
                                                        
6 It is important to note that the kind of community Cohen has in mind is not the one envisaged by some 
“communitarian” views according to which social and political cooperation must proceed on the basis of 
shared thick conceptions of the good life. The solidarity at stake is not the narrow solidarity of specific 
groups or associations, but a human solidarity that can in principle extend universally (see note 3 above). 
See also Cohen (2008, 42-45), where a kind of “justificatory community” is invoked, in which political 
proposals are tested on the basis of whether they could be justified in intersubjective encounters amongst 
those affected. Such form of community is supposed to function in diverse social settings, and is thus “not 
some soggy mega-Gemeinschaftlichkeit” (Cohen 2008, 45). As Vrousalis (2010, 213) helpfully remarks, this 
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Although communal reciprocity involves, like market reciprocity, acts of giving and 
taking, there is a crucial difference. Communal reciprocity is not moved by “fear” or 
“greed,” but by the valuing of “the conjunction serve-and-be served as such” (p. 42).7 
 
Community and the Pluralism of Grounds of Justice 
 
Cohen acknowledges that there might be a problem once we think about the 
relation between PC and SPE. PC is supposed to “constrain” (p. 12), “temper” (p. 34), and 
“curb”  (p. 35) the inequalities that SPE permits. Can this be done without conflict with 
what justice demands? 
 
I believe that certain inequalities that cannot be forbidden in the name of 
socialist equality of opportunity should nevertheless be forbidden, in the 
name of community. But is it an injustice to forbid the transactions that 
generate those inequalities? Do the relevant prohibitions merely define the 
terms within which justice will operate, or do they sometimes (justifiably?) 
contradict justice? I do not know the answer to that question. (It would, of 
course, be a considerable pity if we had to conclude that community and 
justice are potentially incompatible moral ideals). (p. 37) 
 
How should we think about this potential conflict? One possibility is indeed to think that 
PC either (a) constrains or (b) contradicts justice. This possibility would presuppose that 
PC is a moral demand that is not also a requirement of justice. This interpretation 
appears to hold for Cohen when he says that the inequalities permitted by SPE                                                                                                                                                                      
idea of mutual justifiability resembles the key demands of Habermas’s discourse ethics. For Habermas’s key 
discursive principles, and their exploration at the political level, see Habermas (1996, 104-111). 
7 Cohen appears to assume that an ethos of equality and community is necessarily at odds with market 
practices. Roemer (2010, 258-261) challenges this view, arguing that the “coordination function” of markets 
can be decoupled from their current (in capitalism) “material incentives” function. Socialism’s distributive 
institutions could eliminate the “fear” factor, and the socialist ethos could overpower the “greed” factor. 
Motivation to work could still exist on the basis of a will to serve, develop one’s capacities, gain appreciation 
by others, etc. (For another account of how markets need not be at odds with socialism see Wright 2010, 
261-265.) Vrousalis (2010, 197) explains Cohen’s view of the market as involving counter-egalitarian and 
counter-communitarian motives by saying that Cohen talks about the market in the specific context of what 
Marx called a “generalized commodity production,” in which the motive of profit is constitutive. It is not 
clear to me, however, that Cohen does not acknowledge that there could be other, non-profiteering 
incarnations of the market. He in fact refers to one of them when discussing Carens’s proposal. Carens 
(1981) envisions a society that uses markets to signal optimal intersections between the demand and supply 
of goods and services, but taxes all incomes to equality, thus using the coordination function of markets 
while dropping their current (capitalist) motivational and distributive functions (Cohen 2009, 63-65, 69). 
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“contradict community” but are “not condemned by justice” (p. 34).8 This claim would 
actually force one to think that PC contradicts justice, and it thus yields option (b). One 
could perhaps rephrase Cohen’s claim to yield option (a), by making the application of 
SPE conditional upon wider moral constraints (imposed by PC) being met.  In both cases, 
justice would have to be seen as a non-trumping moral value. This is something that 
many would find implausible.  
Although I do not argue here that there are no moral grounds that can override 
justice, I want to suggest that we do not need to take Cohen’s tack. We can instead see PC, 
at least in so far as it limits the inequalities permitted by SPE, as itself a requirement of 
justice.9 If we see it this way, then PC would not determine the outer bounds of justice per 
se, but limit the application of a specific demand of justice (viz. SPE). On this 
interpretation, SPE is a pro tanto principle of justice among others, the scope and weight 
of whose application cannot be determined without weighing it against other pro tanto 
principles of justice in an all things considered picture of what justice demands in certain 
circumstances.  
  The advantages of pursuing this approach are mainly two. The first is that we do 
not need to answer the question Cohen does not know how to answer: we do not need to 
think about how community as a non-justice value might limit justice, and we can deflect 
the need to “conclude that community and justice are potentially incompatible ideals”.10 
The second advantage is that this approach helps us to develop a plausible construal of 
justice as including several demands besides economic equality of opportunity. On this 
pluralist view, determining what we owe to each other, as a matter of justice, in our social 
life, involves weighing a diversity of grounds of justice as they might apply in different 
circumstances. I do not only think that this view of justice is intrinsically plausible; I also 
think that there is textual evidence that Cohen himself accepts it.11 This pluralist 
approach could not only factor in some demands of community as demands of justice.                                                         
8 Similarly, when Cohen says that “the socialist aspiration is to extend community and justice to the whole 
of our economic life” (pp 80-1), he seems to assume that community is not an aspect of justice. 
9 How are demands of justice different from wider demands of morality? This is an important question that 
Cohen does not answer in the book we are examining here. We do not find much help in his other recent 
book, Rescuing Justice and Equality. There Cohen defines justice by appeal to the “ancient dictum that 
justice is giving each person her due” (Cohen 2008, 7). But many obligations that we normally take to 
pertain to morality in the wider sense also involve giving persons their due. 
10 Of course, as the rest of this paper shows, this does not mean that we will not have to face difficult 
questions about the balancing of different moral considerations within the domain of justice. Furthermore, 
I am not denying that there are valid questions about the relation between moral considerations of justice 
and other moral considerations that do not pertain to the domain of justice. 
11 See Cohen (2008, 4-5, 7-8) where pluralism of grounds of justice is assumed to exist, and the need for all 
things considered judgments balancing them is acknowledged. For an illuminating discussion of Cohen’s 
approach to justice in this book see Tomlin (2010). Notice, furthermore, that there is nothing in what 
Cohen says in Why Not Socialism? that prevents him from endorsing principles of justice other than SPE. 
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We can, for example, see considerations about the importance of personal choice and 
political self-determination as also grounds of justice. These are considerations that 
already operate in Cohen’s book, and it makes sense to think about how they, like PC, 
might weigh against SPE and other grounds. 
  I will thus explore how we might think about (some interpretations of) PC as a 
ground of justice. I will entertain two considerations, and pursue them in the two sections 
following the next one. The first refers to specific ways in which PC might weigh against 
SPE, and the second concerns the relation between PC and considerations of personal 
choice and political self-determination. In each case, I will have to imagine more 
circumscribed interpretations of communal, non-instrumental caring than the one 
presented by Cohen in his statement of PC. This is unavoidable, as the general idea of 
community as presented in that statement is quite vague. That I do not consider every 
conceivable and important aspect of the ideal of community is important to keep in 
mind, as I briefly explain in the next section. 
 
Some Caveats and Distinctions 
 
  Before presenting the specific interpretations of PC just promised, I want to 
introduce a few caveats and distinctions to prevent misunderstandings and to respond to 
some possible objections.  
  The first caveat is that the requirements of community that I will proceed to 
identify are not meant to exhaust the ideal of community. We can distinguish, for 
example, between forms of concern that address people’s wants and those that address 
their needs. Both appear in the third passage from Cohen regarding communal care that I 
quoted at the end of the second section. However, in what follows I will only focus on 
forms of community that target needs (in particular basic needs). The following caveats 
further develop the present point that I do not pretend in my discussion to exhaust the 
content of community.12 
  The second and third caveats are related with each other, and concern my 
treatment of the distinctions between principles of justice and wider principles of 
morality and between demands focused only on outer behavior and those focused also on 
attitudes or maxims. The second caveat is that I do not claim that all demands of 
community are demands of justice. For example, we could say that saying “Good 
morning” to your neighbors when you encounter them on the stairs of your building 
when you leave it in the morning is an appropriate expression of community, but we 
would not want to demand such a practice as a matter of justice. I have no quarrel with 
this point. Not all forms of communal treatment are owed to others as duties of justice. 
                                                        
12 For more on the ideal of community in Cohen see the rich discussion in Miller (2010). 
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But this is compatible with the point that some of them are, and this conceptual 
possibility is enough for my purposes. 
  The third caveat addresses the following possible objection. Communal 
reciprocity, as presented by Cohen, is centered on the inner attitudes underpinning 
people’s interactions, not merely on the outer behavior (and the distributive outcomes) 
that such interactions also involve. To respond, it is true that I will largely focus on 
principles of community ranging over outer behavior. But (and this is the third caveat) I 
think that they have a natural counterpart at the attitudinal level that should also be 
pursued. I agree with Cohen that demands of justice should focus on the fostering of a 
certain ethos in addition to the design of institutions imposing certain forms of regular 
behavior.13 What I proceed to say can and should be extended so as to include 
recommendations concerning the political culture of a socialist society.  
  Let me elaborate on the last point to dispel a further objection. Someone might 
complain that to envisage (as I will) coercive institutions to secure communal behavior 
and outcomes is inconsistent with the ideal of community. For example, a coercive 
mechanism securing Alicia’s contribution to the fulfillment of Bertrand’s needs might 
recruit non-communal motivations (on the part of Alicia) such as fear or greed, which are 
the opposite of a communal motivation such as generosity or solidarity. In response, we 
can notice that coercive schemes could recruit both communal and non-communal 
motivations, and that this may be all things considered acceptable. To see this, we need to 
notice that in nonideal circumstances  (and perhaps in most feasible circumstances) 
people display both communal and non-communal tendencies. Coercive institutions may 
be justified (as we will see below) to secure the outcomes that communal concern seeks to 
secure in the face of obstacles springing from people’s non-communal attitudes. But 
institutions can express communal concern on the part of citizens in their capacities as 
both law-makers and law-abiders. Citizens can, out of communal concern, design and 
obey institutions that foster communal behavior and outcomes. Why not skip the 
coercive institutions and just go for communal behavior motivated by communal 
concern? The answer is: because community oriented citizens also recognize their (and 
others’) motivational frailty, which they offset through institutional mechanisms 
generating extra-incentives. Certainly this is less than ideal, but it may be all things 
considered acceptable in the face of some tough facts of the world.14 Furthermore, this 
acceptance of institutional mediation can, and should, be coupled with a demand to 
progressively expand (for example through education and public debate) an ethos of 
                                                        
13 See Cohen (2008, ch. 3). 
14 It is important to notice that Cohen himself appears to envisage coercive institutional implementations of 
the ideal of community when he suggests that that ideal may ground “forbidding” certain practices that lead 
to inequalities of outcome that undermine community (see p. 37). 
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communal concern that limits the need of coercion and of instrumental rather than 
solidaristic incentives.15 
  Consider a final objection before proceeding. Is not the whole exercise just 
semantic relabeling without practical consequence? Given that Cohen himself recognizes 
that justice as socialist equality of opportunity can conflict with other moral demands, 
and perhaps needs to yield to them, isn’t he allowing for the kind of pluralism and 
weighing I am calling for? In any case, should we not join Joseph Raz in his puzzlement, 
reported by Cohen, concerning why we should care so much about what does and what 
does not belong to justice?16 What is crucial, we could say, is that we get a clear picture 
about the content, structure, and relative weight of different moral demands. Whether we 
call them demands of justice is not decisive. Although I agree that, at the end of the day, it 
is true that what is crucial is indeed that we have such a picture of our overall moral 
duties, I still think that considering whether justice includes further demands is valuable 
for two reasons. The first is that we may simply want to know why some demands of 
community cannot also be seen as demands of justice. I think that they can, and I find no                                                         
15 As I explain in Gilabert (2011), we have reason to adopt a transitional standpoint spanning long-term 
historical change. A transitional standpoint is the standpoint taken by political agents in the process of 
changing central features of the institutional and cultural environment in which they act. Such agents 
envisage trajectories of reform involving dynamic duties. These duties are peculiar in that they are not 
merely focused on what is to be done within certain circumstances, but also on changing certain 
circumstances so that new things can be done. Interestingly, Karl Marx seemed to adopt a transitional 
approach in his discussion of the two stages of a “communist society” presented in his “Critique of the 
Gotha Program” (Marx 1978). The two stages differ as follows. First, in the higher stage, unlike in the lower 
stage, there is no material scarcity, division of labor is eliminated, and labor becomes inherently attractive. 
Second, distribution of consumption goods in the higher stage tracks people’s needs, whereas in the lower 
stage it responds to workers’ productive contributions (after a set of resources are put aside to secure the 
reproduction of basic economic and political institutions, the satisfaction of people’s basic needs for 
education and health care, and the provision of benefits for those unable to work). Whereas the lower stage 
distributes to each according to their contribution (thus following what some Marxists call the 
Contribution Principle), the latter instantiates the slogan “from each according to their abilities, to each 
according to their needs” (the Needs Principle). The Contribution Principle is justified as a pragmatic 
imperative; its role is to create incentives to increase productivity to make the higher stage of communism 
attainable. Marx’s rationale for limiting the demandingness of distribution in the lower stage is a pragmatic 
concern with feasibility, not a principled rejection of deeper communal reciprocity or equality. Marx 
worries that in its lower stage a communist society is “in every respect, economically, morally and 
intellectually, still stamped with the birth marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges” (Marx 
1978, 529). Marx thinks that the Contribution Principle is only a transitional principle, and he clearly sees it 
as evaluatively inferior to the Needs Principle. The former condones the inequality of rewards that result 
from individuals having different natural endowments (productive abilities and talents). It is the same 
principle that “regulates the exchange of commodities,” and is “still constantly stigmatized by a bourgeois 
limitation” (Marx 1978, 530). The fundamental objective is to make the implementation of the “higher” 
Needs Principle more feasible. 
16 Cohen (2008, 289-90 n. 14). 
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argument in Cohen’s text to the contrary. The second, and more important reason, is 
pragmatic. Demands of justice are commonly given a certain pride of place in political 
contexts, so that they are seen as having at least prima facie priority. Showing that such a 
domain of demands includes demands of community (and, as we will see, demands of 
liberty) will thus make the consideration of their tension with demands of equality of 
opportunity more salient and urgent.17 
 
How PC Might Weigh Against Inequalities Permitted by SPE 
 
There are at least two ways in which we may interpret PC in such a way that it 
grounds plausible limits on the inequalities condoned by SPE.18 One is to link PC with a 
basic sufficientarian principle according to which we owe each other assistance to reach a 
minimal threshold of advantage.19 This minimal threshold can tentatively be seen as 
comprising the bundle of goods access to which is a precondition for living a minimally 
decent life. Such a bundle could include, for example, basic provision concerning food, 
shelter, clothing, and health care. It is in principle possible that some of the individuals 
who start on equal footing end up below this threshold as a result of regrettable choices 
and bad option luck. And it would not be far-fetched to say that they are entitled to be 
brought back to the threshold by others, at least when achieving this would not involve 
extreme sacrifices on their part. This would require redistribution from the prudent to 
the imprudent, but it may not be unreasonable to demand it if we see that citizens have 
reason to take steps to insure everyone against predictable frailties and imperfections of 
human and social life. 
  Another plausible interpretation of PC is to link it with a concern for status 
equality and the conditions of self-respect. Some forms of redistribution, even if they 
unsettle outcomes consistent with SPE, may be warranted if they are necessary to sustain 
the equal standing of members of a political community. One example of this kind of 
concern involves securing what Rawls called the “fair value of political liberty”.20 As we 
will see shortly, socialists care about securing people’s political self-determination. One,                                                         
17 As I said above (see note 10), pluralism about the domain of justice is in fact in tune with Cohen’s 
considered view. 
18 The limitation may occur, as Cohen suggests, by forbidding certain transactions yielding the relevant 
inequalities, or, alternatively, through redistribution altering the outcomes of the transactions without 
forbidding them. A possible  important difference between these options is that the second is less 
constraining of personal choice. 
19 For a comprehensive recent discussion of suffientarianism see Casal (2007). 
20 Rawls (1999, 197-9, 245). Miller (2010: 240) also argues that Cohen’s discussion fails to consider this kind 
of status concern, and the concomitant need to identify some “secure entitlements.” I disagree with Miller, 
however, in that I don’t think that introducing these considerations should motivate the rejection (as 
opposed to the qualification) of the luck-egalitarian principle involved in SPE.  
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status-based, reason to care about it is that its presence involves a public recognition of 
everyone as an equal fellow member of the political community who can actively 
determine its shape besides being passively shaped by it. Now, securing this political 
status requires that people have access to certain material resources permitting them to 
enter the political sphere with comparable bargaining power. Where great inequalities of 
outcome occur, the bargaining power of the worse-off would certainly be seriously 
depressed unless background mechanisms of redistribution are in place. In addition, the 
presence of substantially unequal life prospects may undermine the self-respect of those 
facing significantly lower life prospects. This loss would of course be linked with the 
diminution of status regarding political influence, but it could ramify into further spheres 
of action, as the consequences of past inequalities affect subsequent attempts to pursue 
social advantages.21 
  The foregoing specifications of PC in terms of transfers catering for 
sufficientarian and social and political status considerations would amount to forms of 
communal care that can limit the scope of the inegalitarian outcomes compatible with 
SPE. It is worth noting that these transfers do not aim at eliminating inequalities 
compatible with SPE. The point is just to reduce them. They do not then saturate the 
space of distributive considerations in such a way that the idea of responsibility for one’s 
choices underlying SPE is given no room. Responsibility still has weight, but it does not 
have an absolute one. Its force is checked on the basis of the great importance of other 
concerns such as caring for each other’s survival, self-determination, and self-respect. 
  Someone might ask: Shouldn’t we simply drop SPE? SPE is a case of “luck 
egalitarianism,” which is typically the target of two criticisms. The first is that it demands 
too much as a principle of justice by requiring compensation for natural misfortune. The 
second is that it may be too severe, allowing people to suffer unduly because of bad 
decisions or “option luck”. Perhaps we should adopt a different form of egalitarianism. 
PC already points in the direction of a “social” or “political” conception of equality. This 
kind of conception is for example defended by Anderson (1999) in her proposal of 
“democratic equality,” which focuses on securing the capabilities for citizens to function 
as social and political equals. It is not saddled with the demandingness and the harmful 
severity of a “distributive equality” seeking to compensate for inequalities resulting from 
natural (and other forms of) misfortune. In addition, it already mobilizes the two 
concerns I identified under PC: it directly accounts for equal status and self-respect as 
constitutive concerns of the egalitarian ideal, and it accounts for basic sufficientarian 
entitlements as indirectly justifiable as preconditions for secure social and political 
participation.22                                                         
21 For a helpful discussion of how inequalities compound over time, with deleterious consequences on 
people’s ability to confidently pursue their life projects, see Barry (2005, 44-45). 
22 I thank a referee for suggesting that I address some of the concerns mentioned in this paragraph. 
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  I think, however, that we should stick to a pluralist framework including a “luck 
egalitarian” consideration that is weighed against other pro tanto grounds of justice (such 
as those springing from PC and personal and political liberty). Regarding the first 
criticism to luck egalitarianism, let me make three points. First, I do not think that it is 
unappealing for a distributive outlook to target inequalities resulting from natural 
misfortune. This goal is sometimes disparaged by saying that it is strangely focused on 
“cosmic injustices.” For example, considering the case in which one’s neighbor is more 
prone to cancer than oneself. Miller (2010, 234-235) says that “if God were committed to 
benefitting humanity, God would be unjust in doing less for my neighbor than for me, 
since there is no basis for discrimination”; but, Miller continues, this reasoning does not 
seem to apply to oneself here on earth, as Cohen should recognize given that his approach 
does not rely on theism. One might here be moved to do something for one’s neighbor to 
pursue “a goal of relief for affliction, not equality.” But this is not right. Why would it be 
unjust for God not to weigh natural misfortune but not for us when, let’s say, we decide 
what social arrangements (such as those concerning health care) to favor? In both cases 
the same egalitarian goal seems appropriate: equalize access to health resources, factoring 
in natural misfortune, to the extent that you reasonably can. Of course, if God existed, 
God would be able to do much more than us, but we could do a fair amount, and so we 
should. 
  Perhaps the idea is that our concern for justice should be relational, and that the 
idea of “distributive equality” (including concern for misfortune) misses that. What 
matters from the point of view justice is whether we live with others in ways that involve 
domination and exploitation. We should eliminate those if we are to live as equals. We do 
not need to also try to redress inequalities in life chances due to natural misfortune. Now, 
I certainly agree that the relational concerns mentioned are crucial, and should be added 
to the platform of pro tanto grounds of justice. But why stop there? To relate to others in 
a way that really shows equal respect and concern, we would have to recognize that each 
one of us has reason not only to resent domination and exploitation. We also have reason 
to seek opportunities to live flourishing lives, and to resent having fewer such chances 
than others though no choice or fault of our own. Seen from the supply side: we should 
not only be concerned with the issue whether we relate to others so that we dominate, 
exploit, or oppress them. We should also relate to others in such a way that we grant them 
the same expansive opportunities to live a flourishing life that we seek and think we are 
entitled to have. Luck egalitarianism need not assume atomistic egoism and self-
sufficiency as the norm for human beings. It may express a solidaristic and egalitarian 
concern for the well-being of all. 23 
                                                        
23 As Cohen puts it when describing the ideals behind the “camping trip,” “people [should] cooperate 
within a common concern that, so far as possible, everybody has a roughly similar opportunity to flourish, 
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  Of course, such a concern is constrained by considerations of responsibility. But 
(and this is the third point), responsibility is indeed an important consideration as soon 
as we take into account the issue of the fair allocation of burdens of cooperation in a 
social world where resources are scarce. The concern for responsibility in luck 
egalitarianism is appealing because it tracks the intuition that we should be mindful of the 
fact that our life choices may impose costs on others.24 
  The last point partially responds to the second criticism, according to which luck 
egalitarianism is too severe towards those suffering from bad “option luck.” 
Responsibility is important. However, I think that the second criticism is also partially 
right, and this is why I think that SPE should be qualified by reference to the 
sufficientarian and status-egalitarian aspects of PC.25 But as I said I don’t think that this 
acknowledgment should carry us over to rejection of SPE. SPE still has important 
(although limited) room for operation. Furthermore, I do not think that the conception 
of “democratic equality” captures the basic sufficientarian element of PC properly. Of 
course, to secure the capability to function as equals (in the relevant senses for this 
conception), people must have available what the sufficientarian distribution described 
here demands (and more). However, it is important to have a separate basic 
sufficientarian principle for two reasons. The first is that part of the value of meeting 
basic needs is independent from the contribution this makes to rendering status equality 
possible.26 The point of not letting people starve is not only the indirect one of securing 
that they are able to vote or participate in public deliberation. Furthermore, we can 
encounter (hypothetical or real) scenarios in which trade-offs between basic 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and also to relax, on condition that she contributes, appropriately to her capacity, to the flourishing and 
relaxing of others” (pp. 4-5). 
24 As Kymlicka (2006) argues, this mindfulness could be seen as part of the ethos that should animate an 
egalitarian society. We should “look critically at the claims of resources we make, and … ask ourselves 
whether we are trying to gain economic privileges from our undeserved natural talents, and/or to 
externalize the cost of our choices to others” (Ibid., 23). This scrutiny could be a self-directed requirement, 
and thus perhaps circumvent the common criticisms that luck egalitarianism demands charging 
institutions with the infeasible or intrusive task of tracking the choice / circumstance distinction in the 
condition of contributors and recipients of distributive policies, and that it leads to humiliating treatment of 
the “deserving poor” or the “negligent” through speech acts evaluating differences in their natural 
endowments and their life choices (Ibid., 20-22, 23-25, 31). 
25 Social and political status equality could be presented as a separate principle of equality alongside SPE. I 
think that this would be a good idea. The reason why I present status egalitarian considerations under the 
heading of PC in this paper is that I am proceeding through an internal discussion of Cohen’s framework. 
But I think that there are many forms of equality that are worth endorsing, both intrinsically and 
instrumentally. For an illuminating articulation of several egalitarian principles, including status equality, 
see White (2007, ch.1). 
26 This point is also made in Wolff (2010, 349). Wolff also calls for a pluralistic approach to justice 
(involving, for example, the balancing of considerations of fairness and respect). 
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sufficientarian and other demands (including status-based ones) occur, and we cannot 
make sense of them unless we distinguish the former from the latter. 
 
PC, Freedom and Coercion 
 
A possible worry about PC is that it may unduly constrain people’s room for 
personal choices. As Cohen acknowledges, socialists care about securing for everybody 
some such room (pp. 22-4, 47-8, 76). One can, in fact, say that securing some amount of 
personal freedom is a matter of justice. But of course there is the question of how much 
room we are entitled to. Not being strict libertarians, most socialists do not think there is 
an absolute entitlement. Redistribution along SPE certainly constrains people’s choices in 
significant, but justifiable, ways. What about PC? Does it depress people’s personal liberty 
in unjustifiable ways? 
  This question becomes appropriately salient once we see PC as a stringent 
demand of justice, as one of the typical features of justice is that it delimits the boundaries 
of individuals’ liberty. (If we did not see PC as a stringent demand of justice, then it 
would be harder to understand how it could ever limit liberty.) To answer this concern 
we can do two things. The first is to consider the implementation of PC through non-
coercive mechanisms, and the second is to consider it in terms of coercive mechanisms. 
In both cases I assume, with Cohen and with most socialists, that personal freedom is a 
ground of justice, but also one whose prescriptive content and weight depends on overall 
judgments considering other grounds.27 
  Imagine first that the transfers implementing PC could be secured without 
coercion. We might imagine that the state could be, as Engels, following Saint-Simon 
once thought it would be, reduced to the “administration of things, not of persons.” Or, 
less unrealistically, we could imagine that some of the state’s distributive tasks are, while 
others are not, implemented coercively. Either way, let us imagine that we have 
institutions implementing PC non-coercively. These institutions would provide the 
logistics for the transfers, but it would be up to the individual choice of citizens to 
voluntary donate funds for such allocation to take place. One can say that there is here a 
moral limitation of personal choice even if there is no coercion backing it. Even if nobody 
may coerce Anne (who is quite rich) to give away part of her income to support 
sufficientarian or status based transfers for the benefit of Benjamin (who is quite poor), it 
might still make sense to say that Anne is not entitled to all of her income when she could 
give away part of it to favor Benjamin without incurring unreasonable sacrifice. Of course                                                         
27 This assumption is of course the target of libertarian challenges to redistributive theories. I will not 
address these important challenges here. See Narveson (1988), and Nozick  (1974). For Cohen’s systematic 
response to libertarianism, see Cohen (1995). I discuss some libertarian arguments in Gilabert (2006) and 
(2010). 
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we can assume, as many do, that injustice and liability to coercion co-vary, and that this 
co-variation is essential to what justice is. But some, including Cohen, do not accept this 
assumption. As we saw (in the fourth section) the site of justice can be seen as wider than 
the set of coercive institutions of a society. If this view is correct, then it would indeed 
make sense to say that transfers based on PC can involve just limitations of the room for 
personal choice (for example regarding the use of income) even if no coercion is 
marshaled.28 
  Imagine now (more realistically) that transfers implementing PC are backed by 
coercive institutional mechanisms, such as taxation. Presumably, the implementation of 
SPE can, and normally would, be implemented (at least partially) through coercive 
institutional mechanisms of this kind. Transfers implementing PC might also proceed in 
this way. Would this be acceptable given the additional costs regarding personal freedom? 
This case would be different from the one considered in the previous paragraph because 
the limitation on freedom would not only constrain the range of goods an agent is 
entitled to use without an obligation to cater for community oriented demands. In 
addition, the liability to coercion limits the ability of the agent to decide whether they act 
in accordance with their community-based obligations without facing interference from 
others.29 
                                                        
28 It is of course possible to say that no freedom is limited here, as it is up to the agents under moral 
obligations to decide whether they discharge them. But my concern here is not freedom of choice in this 
general sense, but the extent of people’s prerogative to act as they want without having to cater for others’ 
demands. In Rescuing Justice and Equality Cohen makes the first point (about non-coercive obligations not 
limiting freedom of choice) (Cohen 2008, 192, 198-9). But he also acknowledges the possibility of conflict 
between a personal prerogative and particularly demanding pictures of people’s obligations. There is, 
according to Cohen, a “legitimate personal prerogative” which “grants each person the right to be 
something other than an engine for the welfare of other people: we are not nothing but slaves to social 
justice” (Cohen 2008, 10; see also 220). This prerogative is not, however, absolute. Each agent, in their 
practical deliberations, must seek to ascertain its legitimate boundaries by weighing it against other 
appropriate demands of justice that apply to the circumstances under consideration (Cohen 2008, 220). 
29 To see this difference, consider a parallel example involving two cases. 
Case 1: A and B are two survivors of a shipwreck. They are at sea on board two lifeboats. Before leaving the 
sinking mother ship, they had to choose among the available lifeboats. A and B could both choose from two 
lifeboats, one being clearly better than the other. A took a longer time to choose than B, thinking that 
perhaps the mother ship would not sink after all. As a result, A ended up boarding the defective lifeboat. 
Now A’s lifeboat is sinking. A will die unless rescued by B, who is nearby, on board an excellent lifeboat that 
could hold both A and B (and some others) without significant risks. Is B morally entitled to refrain from 
rescuing A? 
Case 2: The same as Case 1, but add now a third survivor, C, who is on the lifeboat with B. C, unlike B, 
cannot swim, and thus cannot jump into the water and rescue A. But C is physically stronger than B, and 
can credibly threaten B by saying that they will break B’s arm if B refuses to rescue A. Is it morally 
acceptable for C to coerce B to rescue A in this way if B would not do it voluntarily? 
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  A justification of this further limitation of freedom could be based on several 
considerations. First, we can compare the relative moral weight of (a) the two losses of 
freedom mentioned in the previous paragraph and (b) the loss in terms of secure survival 
and status that would accrue to some if PC is not implemented. If the implementation of 
PC does not involve unreasonable sacrifices, and there is still plenty of room for people to 
pursue personal projects without interference from others, then it seems clear that (b) 
outweighs (a). Of course, it would be better if (a) did not include the threat of coercion. 
But if such a threat is crucial to prevent free-riding or to provide assurance to those who 
want to help without being “suckers,” then the additional loss may, all things considered, 
be justified.30 
  An additional point concerns the importance of political self-determination, a 
crucial aspect of the ideal of freedom besides personal liberty. In a socialist society, 
redistributive mechanisms would be controlled by those affected by them through 
procedures of political self-determination. Socialists normally take equality of 
opportunity for political influence to be amongst their core demands.31 Political self-
determination is relevant to our discussion in several ways. First, it provides (as we saw 
when arguing for PC-based limitations of the inequalities compatible with SPE) one of 
the grounds for PC-based redistribution. Avoiding extreme inequalities is a precondition 
for securing the fair value of political liberty.  
  Second, political liberty would be an important tool for those affected by coercive 
public institutions to keep them in check. This would include the ability to challenge                                                         
30 Of course, not all forms of coercion would be acceptable. A Stalinist conscription of forced labor, for 
example, would likely be unacceptable. Here I have in mind fairly mild coercive mechanisms such as 
taxation. See Cohen (2008, 221-222) on why this form of coercion is not very troublesome and how it might 
be better than the alternatives in securing as much overall freedom as we can get. And securing as much 
overall freedom as we can get is indeed the relevant aim. It is no decisive objection to socialism to show that 
freedom would be limited in it in some way if any feasible alternative would limit freedom even more. 
Arguably, once we understand “freedom” in its multiple senses (including capability to function in valuable 
ways, avoid undue interference, and avoid domination) then we can see that capitalism, with its highly anti-
community and anti-equality tendencies, is in fact quite likely to render people less free than a non-
authoritarian socialism. For illuminating discussion of how capitalism hampers the “real freedom” of 
workers and the relatively poor (to pursue their life plans, to bargain in the market, to be self-directing at 
the workplace, and to affect the shape of the political process), see Wright (2010: 50-52, 81-84) and Van 
Parijs (1995, ch.1). 
31 Cohen refers to democracy as part of the socialist ideal in Cohen (1995: 253, 261). See also, for example, 
John Roemer’s account of socialism in terms of three demands of equality of opportunity for (a) self-
realization and welfare, (b) political influence, and (c) social status (Roemer 1994, 11-15). Wright (2010: 12-
20) construes socialism as being animated by egalitarian principles of “social justice” and “political justice” 
(both involve status considerations, and the latter emphasizes democratic empowerment). For an argument 
justifying economic socialist redistribution as a precondition for the feasibility of a robust, deliberative form 
of democracy, see Joshua Cohen (1989). A deliberative form of democracy should be appealing to someone 
committed to Cohen’s idea of “justificatory community” (see note 5 above). 
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potential overreach in the limitation of personal freedom, which is an inherent risk of any 
political system.  
  Finally, coercive institutional structures can be not just potential threats to 
personal freedom but also their protectors and enablers, and thus normally citizens have 
reason to favor their presence. The issue is how they can be framed in such a way that the 
multiple concerns of justice are catered for in justifiable ways. To find the optimal 
balance, political liberty is again desirable. Besides the considerations of status and of 
accountability (indicated above), political liberty has the epistemic significance of 
affording those affected by political decisions the opportunity to participate in the 
discovery of the appropriate balancing of considerations that should ground them. In this 
respect, one can see concerns about community and personal freedom as being among 
the substantive guidelines framing the public deliberation of politically free agents. 
  These three considerations certainly do not eliminate the tension between 
individual liberty and political self-determination.32 But it is hard to imagine how this 
tension could be eliminated. The relevant task is, rather, to find an appropriate balance. I 
do not think there is any ready and compelling algorithm to dissolve it. And the same 
applies, I think, to tensions involving other fundamental grounds of justice. But what 
makes the socialist ideal (and Cohen’s extraordinary contribution, with perhaps some 
amendments suggested here) so inspiring is that it keeps all of their components (the 
various concerns for freedom, community, and also equality) firmly in play.33 
                                                        
32 The danger is for the right to political self-determination to become the right of everyone to monitor the 
personal life of each. The sphere of genuine personal choice might shrink under the pressure of having to 
behave in ways that others would approve of. The risk is that of having a “free society” that is not a “society 
of free people” (Van Parijs 1995, 15-17), but rather one where “the ‘self-government’ spoken of is not the 
government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest” (Mill 1991, 8). Socialist are, but should be more, 
alive to this risk. Thus, for example, when Wright (2010, 12) states his principle of “political justice,” which 
calls for “all people […to] have broadly equal access to the necessary means to participate meaningfully in 
decisions about things that would affect their lives” he perspicuously includes reference to both “the freedom 
of individuals to make choices that affect their own lives as separate persons” and “their capacity to participate 
in collective decisions which affect their lives as members of a broader community.” However, his subsequent 
discussion of this principle’s content and implications does not seem to me to address the possibility of 
tension between its two components. The boundaries between the two spheres assumed in the principle is 
always a subject of difficult negotiation. (Further discussion is also needed to address the possible tensions 
between the principle of “political justice” and the principle of “social justice” calling for “broadly equal 
access to the necessary material and social means to live flourishing lives.” Although the implementation of 
each principle is normally likely to contribute to the implementation of the other, conflicts could arise here 
as well. Just as the democratic will of the people may sometimes fail to protect personal freedom, it may also 
fail to select optimal opportunity sets for flourishing lives.) 
33 For helpful comments I thank the referees for Socialist Studies, Roberto Gargarella, Anca Gheaus, Carol 
Gould, James Johnson, Holly Lawford-Smith, William Clare Roberts, Adam Swift, Patrick Tomlin, Daniel 
Weinstock, Jurgen De Wispelaere, Lea Ypi, and audiences at Columbia University, McGill University, the 
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